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Historically, central banks have had the dual objective of safeguarding monetary and financial stability.  Increasingly, 
over the last two decades or so, concerns about financial stability have gained prominence, reflecting the growing 
number, breadth and severity of bouts of financial distress. At the same time, the role of central banks in safeguarding 
financial stability has been evolving. In part, this has resulted from developments in the financial system in the wake of 
liberalisation and innovation. More recently, some central banks have been divested of their supervisory responsibilities 
through changes in legislation. Structurally, as the blurring of distinction between different types of institutions (banks, 
securities firms and insurance companies) continues, there remains the issue of whether single or multiple supervisory 
authorities should be the norm and whether the central bank should be assigned any supervisory role. In this context, 
the present chapter seeks to understand the cross-country evidence with regard to regulation and supervision. The 
purpose of the Chapter is to delineate the extant arrangements of regulation and supervision and whether supervisory 
authority in respective countries is conducted monopolistically by the central bank or shared with other supervisory 
authorities. Such an analysis seeks to achieve two broad objectives: (a) whether and to what extent do different 
countries exhibit different supervisory arrangements and (b) on the basis of available evidence, what broad inferences 
can be gleaned regarding the synergies between supervision and monetary policy? 
 
Introduction  
Historically, central banks have had the dual objective of safeguarding monetary and financial 
stability.  Increasingly, over the last two decades or so, concerns about financial stability have gained 
prominence, reflecting the growing number, breadth and severity of bouts of financial distress (Goldstein et 
al., 2000). At the same time, the role of central banks in safeguarding financial stability has been evolving. 
In part, this has resulted from developments in the financial system in the wake of liberalisation and 
innovation. More recently, some central banks have been divested of their supervisory responsibilities 
through changes in legislation. Structurally, as the blurring of distinction between different types of 
institutions (banks, securities firms and insurance companies) continues, there remains the issue of whether 
single or multiple supervisory authorities should be the norm and whether the central bank should be 
assigned any supervisory role.  
  In this context, before an examination of the Indian evidence with regard to the present 
arrangements of regulation and supervision, the present article seeks to understand the cross-country 
evidence with regard to regulation and supervision. The purpose of the chapter is to delineate the extant 
arrangements of regulation and supervision and whether supervisory authority in respective countries is 
conducted monopolistically by the central bank or shared with other supervisory authorities. Such an 
analysis seeks to achieve two broad objectives: (a) whether and to what extent do different countries exhibit 
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different supervisory arrangements and (b) on the basis of available evidence, what broad inferences can be 
gleaned regarding the synergies between supervision and monetary policy?  
 
2.  Framework of analysis 
Financial stability can be safeguarded by appropriate action at both micro and macro levels. The 
micro dimension consists of three building blocks: institutions, markets and infrastructure, of which 
payment and settlement systems are the element closest to central banks. The macro dimension relates to 
interest rates, asset prices and aggregate size of the balance sheet. The authorities can safeguard each of 
the three building blocks in three ways: by developing, implementing and sanctioning non-compliance with 
norms of behaviour (regulation), by monitoring the norms (supervision) and by providing insurance 
(emergency liquidity support, depositor protection). Regulation yields direct influence on behaviour, 
supervision provides information while insurance provides protection. For central banks, the 
macroeconomic lever is the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. At the same time, 
insurance and though often neglected, prudential controls have macroeconomic implications as well.  
In recent years, much attention has been devoted to understanding what should be the appropriate 
norms for the micro blocks; examples include the debate on capital standards or the balance between 
constraints on balance sheet and disclosure. Yet equally significant question relates to the extent to which 
different competencies for stability should be combined or kept separate across institutions (central banks, 
supervisory agencies, Governments, etc). The import of the issue stems from two important reasons. First, 
instability in one component of the financial system almost invariably spills onto the others. The failure of 
institutions typically causes problems for both markets and infrastructure. Conversely, markets and 
infrastructure are the key channels of transmission of strains across institutions. An over-extension in 
aggregate balance sheets and asset prices often lie at the root of generalised financial disturbances, as 
illustrated by the experiences of East Asian economies. Second, and for much the same reasons, there is a 
degree of complementarity between the competencies for stability of the various segments. For example, 
views differ on whether it is possible to reconcile responsibility for the safety of the settlement systems 
without information about, and some control over, the soundness of participants. Ultimately, this is what 
lies beyond the problem of defining concretely an overall responsibility for financial stability that excludes 
a responsibility for individual institutions.  
A schematic overview of the objectives of supervision and their degree of importance is given in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Objectives of Supervision 
Type of Business/ 
Objectives of Supervision  Banking Securities  Insurance 
1. Systemic Risk  **  **  * 
2. Prudential (Solvency Control)  **  *  ** 
3. Consumer Protection/ 
Conduct of Business 





Note: ** Very Important; * Important; $ Not clear   3
 
  It is possible to distinguish three broad categories of financial regulation and supervision: 
systemic, prudential and conduct of business.  
  Systemic supervision takes a broader view of the economy than merely the undertakings of 
individual institutions. Such supervision is focused on the health and ability of financial systems to 
withstand shocks, with special regard to the likely impact of financial disturbances on the economy as a 
whole. In practice, this area of supervision is essentially the domain of central banks, given their knowledge 
of the macro-economy, financial markets and payment systems and their ability to assist in managing 
threats to systemic stability. 
  Prudential supervision, on the other hand, examines the health of individual financial institutions. 
In other words, such supervision places explicit emphasis on analysing the balance sheet of individual 
institutions, especially with regard to their compliance of certain broad parameters (e.g., capital adequacy, 
asset classification and provisioning norms, credit concentration norms, etc) as laid down by the regulatory 
authorities. The aims of prudential supervision can be seen as both consumer protection and reducing the 
threat of spill-over effects on the larger economy. The latter concern is especially relevant for the larger 
financial institutions.  
  The final type relates to the conduct of business regulation. In other words, it seeks to examine 
how financial firms carry out business with their customers. It is focused more on aspects of consumer 
protection, such as information disclosure, honesty, integrity and fair business practices. Conduct of 
business regulation sets rules and guidelines as to appropriate behaviour and business practices when 
dealing with customers. 
 
3. Cross-Country Evidence 
It is instructive to examine, in this context, the cross-country evidence of regulation and 
supervision of banks in different economies. Recently, several studies have documented the role and degree 
of involvement of the central bank in regulation and supervision (Tuya and Zamolla, 1994; Goodhart, 
1995a 1995b; Goodhart, 1998a, 1998b; Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1998, Goodhart et al., 1998). It is 
instructive to look into these experiences. Without being unduly exhaustive, a set of countries sufficiently 
representative across continents in terms of supervisory responsibility has been considered, taking into 
account the information availability and the data set for the empirical exercise that is to follow. 
In developed economies, there is a general tendency among central banks to retreat from 
supervisory function (Briault, 1999). This was exemplified recently in the UK by the breakaway of the 
supervisory functions from the Bank of England in May 1997 and the establishment of the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), a mega financial supervisory authority. Several reasons have been advanced for 
this trend. First, banking is becoming increasingly complex business and less clearly defined. Leading 
banks are active in several jurisdictions as providers of a gamut of financial services. Linked to this are new 
developments in financial supervision, which increasingly stresses the role of self-regulation and internal   4
risk management in financial institutions. Finally, there is growing acceptance that bank failures are 
increasingly becoming expensive, going beyond the sums that banks can provide from its own resources. 
This was demonstrated earlier in the decade by Nordic countries (Sweden and Norway), in certain 
European countries (Denmark and France) and in some Asian economies (Japan and Korea).  
In developing countries, the central bank is primarily responsible for the regulation and 
supervision of deposit-taking institutions, and in several cases, several other financial intermediaries as well 
(India, Malaysia, Malawi, Sri Lanka and Uganda). Only three central banks (Peru, Mexico and Chile) do 
not perform the primary prudential regulator and supervisor role. Peru, for instance, assign the narrowest 
financial stability role to its central bank: it has no direct responsibilities for the development or 
implementation of the regulatory or supervisory environment (Sinclair, 2000). The Chilean banking system 
has certain powers specified in the law and retains responsibility for the regulation and supervision of the 
foreign exchange market under the Central Bank Organic Law. The central bank might give its views to the 
supervisor on new entrants and closures, with respect to the stability of the financial system. In other 
countries, the central bank has expanded its supervisory role as new financial intermediaries have 
developed. Broadening the central bank’s supervisory role beyond banks has enabled countries to respond 
to gradual changes in the financial sector without incurring the costs of a review and the implementation of 
a change in institutional responsibilities (Table 2). 
Table 2: Studies on Central Bank Involvement in Supervision 
Author/Year Country/  Period  Issue 
Hawkesby (2000)  --  Combining  bank  supervision  and 
monetary policy 
Courtis (1999)  Developed  and 
developing 
How countries supervise their banks, 
insurance and securities markets 
Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999)  Developed  and 
developing 
Should banking supervision and 
monetary policy be vested to 
different agencies 
Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1999)  US banks  Synergies involved in retaining bank 
supervision with central bank
 
Barth, Nolle, Phumiwasana and Yago 
(2002) 
Cross-country  Analysis of bank supervisory 
framework and performance 
 
4. Mega-financial Supervisor versus Specialist Supervisor 
Another issue of attention is whether financial supervision should be assigned to one entity or 
should be determined by the type of business of the institution under supervision. The case for the former, 
at first sight, seems attractive, more so if the successful functioning of the FSA is taken into account. It 
presupposes that there are economies of scale (and probably economies of scope)
2 in supervision, as well as 
certain practical advantages. There is ‘one-stop shopping’ for authorizations for conglomerate financial 
groups. Expertise is pooled and cooperation between different functional supervisors guaranteed. A single 
authority could also lead to lower supervisory fees, at least in economies where the financial sector 
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contributes directly to the cost of supervision. Among the 40 countries surveyed, 6 have a ‘mega regulator’
3 
(combined regulator for banking, insurance and securities), whereas several countries have a supervisory 
structure where banking, insurance and securities (2 out of the three) are under a single umbrella, while the 
remaining is under a specialist supervisor (see, Briault, 1999 for a discussion of the UK experience). 
The differences in risk profiles and in the nature of businesses remain an important argument 
against a mega-supervisor, most importantly for banking as compared to insurance business. In fact, the 
case for efficiency of mega-regulator is not well-established (Goodhart et al., 1998). A mega-authority 
could quickly become a collection of separate divisions. Moreover, it could be a very powerful entity and 
increase moral hazard (reduce the incentive for institutions to prudently manage their business). The public 
perception might be that the while financial sector is under control, and the loss of confidence arising from 
the failure of one institution could be even larger (Table 3). 
Table 3: The Case for Specialist versus Multiple Supervisors  
A Mega-Supervisor  Specialist Supervisor 
One stop shopping for authorizations  More effective and easier to manage 
Pooling of expertise and economies of scale   Clearly defined mandates 
Lower supervisory fees  More adapted to the differences in risk profiles and 
nature of the respective financial business  
Adapted to evolution in financial sector towards 
financial conglomerates 
Better knowledge of the business 
Cooperation between type of financial business 
guaranteed 
Stimulates inter-agency competition 
Limited regulatory arbitrage   
Greater transparency   
  
What does evidence point out in this regard? In order to understand the institutional separation of 
two of the major functions of central banks (monetary policy and supervision), we conduct a simple test 
towards understanding whether independent central banks are better in attaining the goal of price stability 
vis-à-vis ones which are not. Towards this end, we classify central banks into four classes: monopolist in 
supervision and independent, monopolist in supervision and non-independent, non-monopolist in 
supervision and independent and non-monopolist in supervision and non-independent). In matrix format, 
this can be represented as in Table 4. 
Table 4: Matrix of Supervisory and Monetary Control of Central Banks 
(selected countries) 
Supervision-> / 
Monetary Policy↓  Monopolist Non  Monopolist 
Independent  Poland, Israel  Austria, Mexico 
Non Independent  Iceland, Egypt  Thailand, UK 
 
In general, financial supervision could be carried out by one agency for systemic stability, a 
second for prudential supervision and a third for consumer protection and conduct-of-business 
considerations. Conduct-of-business supervision looks after transparency, disclosure, fair and honest 
practices and equality of market participants. The ‘stability’ agency concentrates on systemic issues, the 
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prudential agency controls the solvency and soundness of institutions and enforces depositor protection. 
Such a structure obtains in Australia, wherein Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) 
supervises financial institutions on prudential grounds, the Reserve Bank of Australia looks after systemic 
stability and provides liquidity assistance and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) 
controls market integrity and conduct-of-business rules. Some EU countries have elements of objective 
driven supervision. In Italy, for example, the Banca d’Italia is in charge of controlling financial institutions 
on financial stability and prudential ground, the CONSOB enforces conduct of business rules for the 
banking and securities industry. 
 
5. Indian Perspective 
There are several agencies entrusted with the task of regulation and supervision of the different 
institutions and market participants in the financial sector. The three main regulators are the Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI), Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority (IRDA), which are the supervisory agencies for the banking, securities market and 
the insurance sector, respectively. While their specific objective may vary from 
depositor/investor/consumer protection to market regulation, their broad concern remains that of 
maintaining the soundness of the financial system. This structure is not unique to India, and most other 
countries have different agencies for supervising the securities, insurance and banking sectors (Table 5). As 
Abrams and Taylor (2000) observe, 'the combination of banking and securities regulation is most clearly 
appropriate where the system comprises universal banks. In countries where banks are not significant 
players in the securities markets, the case for a combination of function is much less strong. Similarly, the 
combination of banking and insurance regulation is most appropriate where linkages between banks and 
insurance companies are particularly significant. Combining the regulation of all three sectors within a 
single agency will, therefore, be most appropriate when the financial services industry of the country 
comprises of a number of diversified, multi-activity groups or where the distinctions between different 
types of financial intermediaries have become blurred'.  
Table 5: Regulatory Structure in Selected Countries 
Separate agencies for each main sector  35 
Combined securities and insurance regulators  3 
Combined banking and securities regulators  9 
Combined banking and insurance regulators  13 
Unified supervision (in central bank)  3 
Unified supervision (outside central bank)  10 
Source: Abrams and Taylor (2000). Sample 73 countries. 
 
Historically, the Reserve Bank has been the major oversight agency in the financial system and it 
regulates and supervises the major institutions and markets through its various departments and 
affiliated/owned institutions. The supervised institutions include commercial banks, non-banking finance 
companies, all-India financial institutions, urban co-operative banks and local area banks. The Government   7
debt markets and the Primary Dealers in the securities and the foreign exchange markets and the 
Authorised Dealers in foreign exchange are also covered by the supervisory oversight of the RBI. In 
addition, the regional rural banks (RRBs) are regulated by RBI, though their supervision has been relegated 
to NABARD, an institution owned jointly by RBI and Government. In turn, NABARD supervises the other 
co-operative banks (central and state) in the rural sector. In all cases where co-operatives are involved, the 
oversight responsibilities are shared between the RBI / NABARD and the Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies (RCS). The National Housing Bank (NHB), a subsidiary of the RBI, regulates and supervises the 
functioning of Housing Finance Companies. RBI also has nominees on the Boards of State Financial 
Corporations, which are supervised by IDBI (a function being transferred to SIDBI). Interestingly, as part 
of its supervision over the financial institutions, RBI is the supervising agency for NABARD, NHB and 
IDBI/SIDBI. DICGC, an associate institution of RBI, also exercises limited oversight responsibility over 
the insured institutions.  
The other major regulator in the financial system is the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) and it supervises the capital market institutions – the stock exchanges, mutual funds and other asset 
management companies, securities dealers and brokers, merchant bankers, rating agencies and collective 
investment schemes. The involvement of the RBI capital market segment is limited to a position on the 
Board of SEBI.  
With the opening of the insurance sector and the expectation of an increasing number of private 
players entering this sector, the role of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) as a 
insurance sector regulator is expected to gain prominence in coming years  
In addition to the above, various agencies /departments of the Government play a role in the 
regulation of the financial sector. Illustratively, the Registrars of Co-operatives of different states jointly 
regulate the banks in the co-operative sector, both urban and rural. For multi-state institutions, the Central 
ROC under the Ministry of Agriculture is the main regulator. While RBI/NABARD are concerned with the 
banking function performed by them, the management control rests with the State / Central Governments. 
This dual control over institutions in this sector impacts the supervision process by both RBI and 
NABARD. Given the sheer number of institutions in this sector, co-ordination with RCS continues to be 
important to resolve operational issues. The Department of Company Affairs (DCA) of the Central 
Government regulates the deposit-taking activities of non-banking non-financial companies and also certain 
aspects of activities of some non-bank financial companies. 
As early as 1991, the Committee on the Financial System (Chairman: Shri M.Narasimham) had 
recommended that 'the duality of control over the banking system between the Reserve Bank and the 
Banking Division of the Ministry of Finance should end and that the Reserve Bank should be the primary 
agency for the regulation of the banking system' (pp.130).  In line with the recommendations of the 
Committee, the supervisory function of banks (and other financial institutions) was hived off to a separate 
authority as an autonomous body under the aegis of the Reserve Bank. In pursuance of the same, the Board 
for Financial Supervision (BFS) was constituted in 1994 as a Committee of the Central Board of Directors   8
of the Reserve Bank to pay 'undivided attention to supervision', with the Governor of the Reserve Bank as 
the Chairman and four non-official Directors of the Reserve Bank and the Deputy Governors of the 
Reserve Bank as members
4. Operational support was provided by the erstwhile Department of Supervision 
which was subsequently bifurcated into Department of Banking Supervision and Department of Non-
Banking Supervision to cater to the supervision of banks (and financial institutions) and non-banking 
financial institutions, respectively. The BFS, in effect, integrates within the Reserve Bank the supervision 
of banks, non-banks and financial institutions, which comprise the bulk of financial sector assets. Apart 
from enabling the provision of a uniform policy perspective to the regulation of these institutions, this 
arrangement also exploits the synergies arising out of the supervision of these institutions. This has resulted 
in similar prudential supervision being applied to non-banking sector, particularly those accepting/holding 
public deposits. This was also deemed as relevant in the long-run for the AIFIs, which, as envisaged in the 
Discussion Paper, would eventually convert themselves either into banks or NBFCs. 
Subsequently, in 1998, Report of the Working Group for Harmonising the Role and Operations of 
DFIs and Banks (Chairman: Shri S.H.Khan) proposed the concept of a 'super-regulator'. The Group 
advocated two alternative approaches towards regulation. First, in view of the increasing overlap in 
functions being performed by various participants in the financial system, the Group felt that it would be 
desirable to have a measure of co-ordination among regulators, in order to equalize the 'net regulatory 
burden' (the difference between the benefits and costs of regulation). This would seek to ensure that no 
intermediary is relatively disadvantaged in performing an identical function vis-à-vis other intermediaries, 
because of the high level of net regulatory burden on it. Alternately, the Group recommended the 
establishment of a 'Super Regulator' to supervise and co-ordinate the activities of the multiple regulators in 
order to ensure uniformity in regulatory treatment (pp.65). 
The Discussion Paper released by the Reserve Bank in January 1999 observed that the question of 
whether the supervisory responsibility should lie solely with the Board for Financial Supervision or with 
separate supervisory system to be devised for the purpose, would need to be considered in due course. The 
view was also reinforced in a Discussion Paper on Corporate Governance, which emphasized that financial 
institutions should be brought fully under the regulatory and supervisory ambit of the Reserve Bank and 
suitable norms/tools needs to be devised for regulation/supervision of these institutions, consistent with the 
nature of their operations. However, the efficacy of the common supervisory mechanism would not only 
require strengthening the internal controls and ease of monitoring based on a few identifiable parameters, 
but also necessitate stricter auditing and disclosure standards.  
Several issues need to be considered in this regard. First, the structure of the banking industry in 
India comprises of commercial banks and co-operative banks. The distribution of financial assets among 
different intermediaries reveal that banks remain by far the most dominant in terms of their financial assets. 
As at end-March 2000, banks remain the most dominant with nearly 62 per cent of financial assets, 
followed by investment institutions (18.6 per cent), term-lending institutions (15.1 per cent) and co-
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operative banks (2.6 per cent)
5. In view of the overwhelming dominance of banks in the financial system, 
supervision of banks needs to be attached utmost importance.  
Second, there are some other supervisory agencies in the financial sector which are closely linked 
to the Reserve Bank viz., NABARD has been relegated the function of supervising RRBs and the co-
operative institutions in the rural sector. This overlap of supervisory authority creates problems of 
regulatory gaps and overlaps, which often lead to differential net regulatory burden for financial institutions 
offering similar services and/or products.  
Third, the asset structure of co-operative banks is distinctly different from that of commercial 
banks. Apart from the different regulatory authorities involved in their supervision/inspection, the sheer 
numbers
6 and their dispersed and local character (with a different niche clientele) can affect the regular 
programming of inspections by supervisors, given that the supervisory resources are limited. In view of the 
above, supervision of UCBs often proves to be a challenging proposition for the Reserve Bank, so that it 
might prove worthwhile integrating the supervision of co-operative banks under one umbrella. In this 
context, the Monetary and Credit Policy of April 2001 has emphasized the creation of a separate apex 
supervisory authority which can take over the entire inspection/supervisory functions in relation to 
scheduled and non-scheduled UCBs, with manpower and other assistance to the new supervisory body, 
when created. 
Fourth, another major issue involved in the setting up of a separate body is that of culture and 
funding. Supervision is a costly exercise and with growing sophistication and inter-linkages across markets 
and institutions, requires increasingly sophisticated skills and tools. In India at present, supervision has 
access to deep pockets of the Reserve Bank. In the event that the budgetary support is provided by the 
Government, then it might be akin to a department of the Government and subject to political economy 
considerations, possibly with independence being compromised. The independence of supervision function 
is often a sine qua non and has been reiterated by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
Fifth, the re-ordering of relationship between Government as principal/owner and banks as agents, 
through legislative changes or otherwise, would influence the future direction of reforms. In view of the 
conflicting objectives involved in the central bank being both the owner as well as the regulator of several 
institutions, the Monetary and Credit Policy of April 2001 emphasized that the ownership of financing 
institutions could ideally be de-linked from the Reserve Bank through transfer of ownership to the 
Government. It also stated that the Reserve Bank has accepted the recommendation from transfer of 
ownership of its shares in State Bank of India, National Housing Bank and the NABARD to the Central 
Government and was in touch with the Government in this regard. 
It seems that the Board for Financial Supervision (BFS) model is best suited and its role could be 
expanded in future to include oversight of other markets /institutions being supervised by the Reserve Bank 
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and its allied bodies. With the major disturbances in the financial markets in the past decade having been 
linked to the penetration of firewalls between banks and the capital markets, and given the entry of banks 
and the emergence of NBFCs as major players in the insurance business, the co-ordination mechanism 
among various supervisory institutions like the SEBI and IRDA would need to be strengthened. Mention 
may be made in this context that the Narasimham Committee-II had also recommended that the since the 
functions of regulation and supervision are organically linked, BFS should be renamed as Board for 
Financial Regulation and Supervision (BFRS), in order to institutionalise both the regulation and 
supervision function it should perform. The moot issue then remains is whether the supervisory framework 
should evolve towards integrated supervision with a segregation of supervision from central banking, or 
towards coordinated supervision with a structured forum for sharing of information and joint action, 
wherever required. The concept of super-regulator (integrated supervision) is viewed as more relevant 
where markets are fully integrated. For all practical purposes, in emerging market economies, where 
markets tend to be segmented and the transmission of monetary policy is not uniform across markets, co-
ordinated supervision is viewed as a more workable alternative. 
 
6. Tenets of supervisory co-ordination 
This brings us to the final issue: what can be the basic tenets of supervisory co-ordination? As 
discussed earlier, given the liberalisation of national financial markets, technological innovation and the 
removal of legal and trade barriers, institutions have become more complex. With the opening up of the 
insurance sector and the entry of banks and NBFCs into the insurance business, financial structures are 
expected to become increasingly diversified with complex management and corporate setup. The rapid 
evolution of such diversified financial conglomerates which offer a comprehensive range of financial 
services, including banking, securities and insurance services on a global basis as well, presents significant 
challenges to supervisors, with their field responsibility being determined solely by national legislation. 
Given the growing inter-linkages between the institutions in the financial sector, either through common 
markets or products, an appropriate framework for coordination between domestic and international 
supervisors would need to address both information sharing and joint action, in both normal and emergency 
situations. These arrangements can be built around formal MoUs or informal exchanges of letters in case of 
bilateral coordination, such as with overseas supervisors. In a scenario where several regulators are 
involved, a forum which provides for regular interaction built around structured agenda might prove to be a 
more efficient solution. Communication and trust among supervisors therefore becomes the sine qua non of 
co-operation. 
Recognising the relevance of supervisory coordination in a world where multiple agency 
regulation is the norm, the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerate, which has been set up by the BCBS, 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), has examined ways to enhance supervisory coordination and suggested several 
principles on which information sharing and coordination can be based. Although intended for the different   11
supervisors of the regulated firms in the financial conglomerate, these can be equally applied to 
coordination amongst all the regulators in the financial sector.  
This would call for one of the supervisors to be designated as ‘the coordinator’ to facilitate 
information sharing efforts in a timely and efficient manner. In the case of financial conglomerates, it is 
normally the supervisor of the parent entity or dominant entity in terms of either balance sheet size or 
criticality, which is designated as primary supervisor. In the case of a college of domestic regulators, it 
could similarly be the supervisor who takes primary responsibility for supervising the segment of the 
financial system or the supervisor that carries out consolidated supervision who takes on the responsibility 
of maintaining the arrangements for coordination.  
The arrangements for information sharing between the coordinator and other supervisors and for 
any other form of coordination in emergency and non-emergency situations would need to be decided in 
advance, in order to avoid any delay or information asymmetries that might arise during the period. Such 
arrangements should specify the tasks to be performed by the coordinator in terms of information gathering 
from regulated entities, unregulated entities (where permitted by law) and from the various supervisors 
involved or a combination of those sources. Arrangements made in advance may require certain 
modifications to take into account the unique properties of the emergency. 
 
7. Concluding observations 
The present chapter has attempted to assess the validity of having a unified regulator for the 
banking sector, keeping the Indian realities in mind. The balance of evidence is a pointer to the fact that the 
benefits of internalizing the externalities by retaining supervision with the central bank tend to outweigh 
that, if otherwise. If the evidence of the most respected central banks in the world, the Federal Reserve, is 
anything to go by, then this should perforce be the case. It is instructive in this context to reminisce the 
observations by Goodhart (2000): 
I doubt .whether the pressures to establish a unified, supervisory agency are quite strong in 
most developing countries. The financial system is less complex, and dividing lines less 
blurred. Commercial banks remain the key players. Moreover, the central bank in most 
developing countries is relatively well-placed for funding, is a center of technical excellence, 
and can maintain greater independence from the lobbying of commercial and political 
interests on behalf of certain favoured institutions. If the supervisory agency is placed under 
the aegis of the central bank, it should share in these benefits of better funding, technical 
skills and independence. There are too many cases of supervisory bodies, outside central 
banks, failing in such respects. For such reasons, I do not believe that the case for separation, 
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